18 billion sale of Flyme — Is Meizu nearing its end?

Author | Huang Yu When Flyme was sold, it seemed Meizu was one step closer to its full stop. On the evening of June 22, ECARX announced that it had signed a final acquisition agreement to acquire the Flyme software business from Xingji Meizu, including the two core products: the Flyme Auto smart cockpit operating system and the cross-terminal Flyme operating system, for a total transaction amount of 1.8 billion yuan. A question quickly emerged: If even Flyme no longer belongs to Meizu, what does Meizu have left? For Meizu fans, Flyme could be said to be the soul. For more than ten years, Meizu’s core product competitiveness has not just been its hardware, but its system experience known for simplicity and smoothness. But now, this most important asset has officially become part of the ECARX system. However, this deal isn’t merely an asset sale. Behind it is the result of resource integration within the Geely system, as well as the inevitable outcome following years of strategic wavering and the suspension of Meizu’s mobile phone business. Both ECARX and Xingji Meizu belong to the Geely Group. As early as April 2026, ECARX announced it would take over the Flyme OS intellectual property, Flyme Auto business, and R&D team from Xingji Meizu; until this 1.8 billion yuan formal acquisition, completing the final integration. The logic behind this isn’t complicated. In 2024, Geely proposed the “One Geely” strategy, hoping to reduce internal repetitive investments and concentrate dispersed resources on advantageous businesses. The smart cockpit became a key investment focus, and Flyme happened to be one of the few software capabilities within the group to have passed commercial validation. Public information shows that Flyme OS has already developed cross-terminal capabilities covering mobile phones, cars, and wearable devices. Flyme Auto has surpassed 2 million vehicles, with a goal of reaching 3 million vehicles by 2026. Flyme has established business models including software licensing, custom development, and cockpit solution delivery. It is worth noting that ECARX co-founder, chairman, and CEO Shen Ziyu was the first CEO of Xingji Meizu Group after its establishment. In January 2026, Hubei Xingji Meizu Technology Co., Ltd. (i.e., Xingji Meizu) underwent a management filing change, and Shen Ziyu, who had long ago stepped down as Meizu chairman and CEO, became chairman of Xingji Meizu, a position he still holds. ECARX stated it will set up an independent software division to operate the Flyme business, support the iterative upgrade of the Flyme platform and all operating systems, and focus on developing the AI Agent version. Shen Ziyu himself also posted in his WeChat Moments: This year Flyme Auto 3.0 will definitely come to market. Under the huge AI wave, the Flyme Agent technology framework will be implemented. At the same time, the Flyme AiOS on the mobile phone side will continue to receive investment guarantees from ECARX as a listed company, and the system will continue to be upgraded and maintained. This means Flyme will not disappear—just leave Meizu. From “small but beautiful” to continuous decline, and now losing its “soul”, why did Meizu get to where it is today? If you take the long view, Meizu’s decline did not happen suddenly. It was once the most unique presence in China’s smartphone industry. In the Huang Zhang era, Meizu built a strong user reputation on industrial design and Flyme, and at one point was known as one of the two internet phone giants with Xiaomi. In that phase, Meizu’s biggest edge was not scale, but product capability. But the problem was exactly here. As the industry entered the era of supply chain wars, channel wars, and scale wars, Meizu continued to cling to product-oriented thinking. After entering the Geely era, Meizu tried to make a comeback. In 2022, Geely’s Xingji Technology acquired 79.09% of Meizu’s shares and founded Xingji Meizu Group. At the time, the market believed that, depending on Li Shufu, Meizu would get a second life. The new strategy was also aggressive—mobile phones, autos, and XR integration, with a goal to return to the top five mid-to-high-end phones within three years. But reality proved to be harsher than expectations. In recent years, Meizu’s leadership changed frequently: Shen Ziyu, Su Jing, and Huang Zhipan all took turns as leaders. The organization kept adjusting, and strategic direction never stabilized, switching several times among a mid-to-high-end route, cost-performance route, and AI route. The true turning point came in February 2026. Meizu officially announced the suspension of independent R&D for new domestic mobile phones, shifting from hardware-driven to an AI-driven software company and proposing a new model with Flyme’s open ecosystem as its foundation. Although the outside world was skeptical of Meizu’s revival, Meizu still made efforts to interact with third-party brands, attracting some partners. The day after announcing the suspension of self-developed phones, the domestic tablet brand Cube proactively engaged on social media, proposing the idea of “Handheld Play Mini 4 Ultra, Powered by Flyme.” On March 24, Meizu announced that since issuing its “strategic transformation announcement”, multiple consumer electronics, smart cockpit, IoT and other hardware and software manufacturers had begun talks with the company about Flyme ecosystem cooperation, and all cooperation progress was going smoothly. But it’s clear these intentions did not put Meizu back on the right track. So the question arises: Is Meizu finished for good? If you define Meizu as an independent mobile phone manufacturer, the answer seems increasingly clear. After mobile phone R&D was suspended and Flyme was entirely spun off, Meizu has lost its two core capabilities from the past—hardware product definition and operating system leadership. The Meizu brand, which once built recognition on an integrated phone-and-system experience, is nearing its historical end. Risk warning and disclaimer The market involves risk; investment requires caution. This article does not constitute individual investment advice and does not consider individual users’ special investment goals, financial conditions, or needs. Users should consider whether the opinions, viewpoints, or conclusions herein suit their specific circumstances. Investment based on this is at your own risk.