After Hormuz, is the Red Sea next? Houthi threats escalate, shaking the global oil market
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The latest threat from Yemen's Houthi forces has brought a new shock to the already pressured global energy market, which is still suffering from the closure of the Strait of Hormuz.
According to Xinhua News Agency, on the 8th, Yemen's Houthi forces claimed to have launched missiles at "sensitive targets" in Jaffa, central Israel, saying "the intended goal has been achieved," and announced a "comprehensive ban" on Israeli shipping in the Red Sea.
This statement directly threatens Saudi Arabia's key bypass oil export route through the Red Sea—since the Strait of Hormuz was closed, more than 70% of Saudi Arabia's daily crude oil exports have been rerouted to Yanbu Port on the Red Sea, an artery that is now an important support for global oil price stability.
Analysts worry that if the Houthis repeat their previous large-scale attacks on Red Sea shipping, the global energy supply could be hit with a double blow.
After the news was released, oil prices stopped falling and rebounded slightly. As of press time, Brent crude oil futures were up 1.42% on the day at $94.4 per barrel.
The Hormuz closure has caused huge energy waves; the Red Sea is the last "pressure valve"
After Israel and the United States attacked Iran on February 28 this year, Iran immediately closed the Strait of Hormuz. Most oil and other energy exports from the Gulf region were severely disrupted, causing a sharp rise in international oil prices and delivering a major shock to the global energy market.
Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia swiftly adjusted its export strategy, rerouting over 70% of its daily crude oil exports to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, providing a critical alternative supply channel for the global energy market and helping to contain further runaway increases in the oil price to some extent.
However, this very "lifeline" now faces a direct threat from the Houthis. Should the group launch sustained attacks on Red Sea shipping or ports, the impact on the global energy market could be incalculable.
The Houthi precedent: the last round of Red Sea offensives nearly paralyzed international shipping
After the Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the Houthis, under the banner of supporting Palestine, began shelling Israel and attacking international shipping in the Red Sea. This offensive caused severe disruption—global shipping giants like Maersk and Hapag-Lloyd were forced to reroute around Africa's Cape of Good Hope, resulting in longer journeys and sharply increased costs.
The United States then formed a convoy escort task force, launching multiple strikes against Houthi targets and intercepting hundreds of drones and missiles defensively. Nevertheless, some Houthi attacks persisted until last summer, only fully stopping after the October 2023 Gaza ceasefire agreement took effect.
It is noteworthy that, in the previous campaign, the Houthis expanded their target range to include any vessel belonging to companies that had ever used Israeli ports—a broad definition which deterred numerous international shipping firms, leading them to voluntarily abandon Red Sea routes.
Who are the Houthis? What is their relationship with Iran?
The Houthi movement rose to prominence in northern Yemen in the 1990s, initially as a military, political, and religious movement, gradually growing through guerrilla warfare against the Sanaa government.
The group adheres to the Shia Zaydi sect, strengthened its ties with Iran after the 2011 Arab Spring, and in 2014 took advantage of domestic upheaval to seize the capital, disrupting the Gulf-backed political transition process.
Since then, a Saudi-led coalition has intervened in Yemen's civil war, seeking to restore the ousted government and expel Iranian "proxy" forces. During the civil war, the Houthis repeatedly used missiles and drones to attack the oil and infrastructure facilities of Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In 2022, the parties in Yemen reached a ceasefire agreement and the situation generally stabilized.
In terms of their relationship with Iran, Iran considers the Houthis part of its "Axis of Resistance," along with Hezbollah in Lebanon and Shia militias in Iraq. The US accuses Iran of providing the Houthis with weapons, money, and training, but the Houthis deny being Iranian proxies and insist on independently developing their weaponry.
It is worth noting that the Houthis, unlike Hezbollah and Iraq's various factions, do not recognize the religious authority of Iran's Supreme Leader. Their motivations are primarily Yemeni domestic politics, and their connection with Iran is relatively weaker.
Why have the Houthis been relatively quiet in this round of fighting?
Even though Hezbollah and Iraqi factions quickly joined the conflict after the US/Israeli strikes on Iran, the Houthis have remained relatively low-key during this round of fighting involving Iran.
On March 5, the group's leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi said, "our finger is always on the trigger," but before this week, their substantial involvement had been limited to scattered missile and drone attacks on Israel from the end of March to early April.
Analysts believe there are multiple reasons for Houthi restraint:
First, the Houthis and Iran may wish to use "the threat of closing yet another vital energy corridor" to pressure Israel and the US and dissuade further escalation; second, compared to Tehran's other allies, the Houthis may not identify as strongly with Iran's security interests; third, the group may wish to avoid provoking powerful neighbor Saudi Arabia and risking a renewed domestic conflict.
On June 1, Esmaeil Qaani, commander of the Quds Force of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, warned that the Houthis have the ability to "choke off the Red Sea." However, when and to what extent the Houthis will intervene remains highly uncertain, and this uncertainty itself is already a Damocles' sword hanging over the global energy market.
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