Behind Yushi Technology’s IPO: A Shift from Technical Narrative to Business Validation
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On April 19, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange disclosed that UISEE Technology (Beijing) Co., Ltd. had passed the main board listing hearing, with CITIC Securities serving as the sole sponsor. This company, which has focused on closed scenarios for nine years in L4-level autonomous driving, is about to become another new member of the autonomous driving sector welcomed by the HKEX in 2026.
However, the post-hearing data set presented a rather two-sided report card. On one hand, it shows a 90.5% market share in airport scenarios and continuous revenue growth, while on the other, it reports over 655 million RMB in cumulative losses over three years and a continuously rising asset-liability ratio.
As the autonomous driving industry transitions from "storytelling" to "doing" in 2026, UISEE Technology's listing is a public pricing of the closed scenario business model and an important snapshot for observing the capitalization process of autonomous driving.
01 The Financial Duality of the “Champion” in Closed Scenarios
From the perspective of business moat, UISEE Technology chose a path that few have successfully walked.
While most peers fiercely compete in RoboTaxi open-road scenarios, UISEE Technology has rooted itself in airports and factory areas—closed environments—building a hard-to-replicate first-mover advantage.
According to Frost & Sullivan, in 2025, measured by revenue, UISEE Technology holds a 3.1% market share as a provider of L4-level autonomous driving solutions for commercial vehicles in closed scenarios in Greater China. Specifically, its market share in airport scenarios is 90.5%, and in factory scenarios, it is 31.7%, making it the only global supplier for large-scale commercial L4-level autonomous driving solutions in airports. Starting in 2018 with Hong Kong International Airport, the company has already expanded to 17 airports in China and 3 overseas airports.
In 2025, the company secured an order for 65 unmanned electric tractors at Urumqi Tianshan Airport, which, per Frost & Sullivan, is the largest single order for autonomous driving vehicle solutions in the global aviation industry.
However, the continued expansion in business has yet to translate into financial balance.
According to UISEE Technology's publicly disclosed financials, from 2023 to 2025, revenue was 161 million RMB, 265 million RMB, and 328 million RMB, with a compound annual growth rate of 42.7%. Yet net losses were 213 million RMB, 212 million RMB, and 230 million RMB, respectively, totaling about 655 million RMB over three years.
One direct reason for the losses is the high R&D expenditure.
From 2023 to 2025, UISEE Technology's R&D expenses were 184 million RMB, 196 million RMB, and 234 million RMB, accounting for 114.3%, 74.0%, and 71.2% of revenue, respectively.
In the rapidly iterating field of autonomous driving, such intense R&D investment is necessary to maintain competitiveness, but it also creates a heavy financial burden for the company.
Even more noteworthy are several structural indicators.
Accounts receivable growth is outpacing revenue growth. From 2023 to 2025, the company's accounts receivable and notes increased from 140 million RMB to 316 million RMB, with their proportion of revenue rising from 87.0% to 96.3%. For a company mainly engaged in B2B project-based business, longer payment cycles imply accumulated cash flow pressure.
Changes on the liabilities side are equally striking. Financial data shows the company’s asset-liability ratio increased from 25.4% in 2023 to 57.5% in 2025, more than doubling in two years.
As of December 31, 2025, UISEE Technology held 113 million RMB in cash or equivalents. Listing to supplement funds has become a rigid requirement for maintaining operations, rather than an optional action.
Additionally, the company's revenue is highly dependent on domestic markets. From 2023 to 2025, income from mainland China and Hong Kong accounted for 99.6%, 98.6%, and 99.0% respectively. Although the prospectus states the company will actively expand overseas, current overseas business volume remains very limited.
Essentially, UISEE Technology’s growth relies mainly on the number of new projects, not on steadily increasing single-vehicle operational efficiency. This is structurally different from the "fleet-orders-revenue" platform scaling logic of RoboTaxi companies.
A senior industry expert analyzed for Wallstreetcn that UISEE Technology's closed scenario advantages include fast deployment, less regulatory resistance, and relatively high certainty in payment, but the downside is that the market capacity for single scenario is inherently capped.Whether UISEE Technology can maintain its base in airports while replicating its capabilities to larger factory, park, or even open road scenarios will determine the elasticity in its post-listing valuation.
02 The Common Dilemma Behind the IPO Surge of Autonomous Driving Companies
Zooming out to the wider macro industry, UISEE Technology’s listing is not an anomaly but a reflection of the IPO wave across the autonomous driving sector since 2024.
According to public market data, about 15 autonomous driving industry chain companies submitted their applications to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange throughout 2025.
The collective IPO boom for autonomous driving companies since 2025 is not mere trend-following, but tightly related to industry trends.
Domestic autonomous driving “star companies” were mostly founded around 2016, UISEE Technology among them.
Now, early USD and RMB funds are reaching the end of their terms, and IPO bet clauses signed years ago are intensively coming due in 2025. The enormous pressure of capital exit passed straight to companies, and completing an IPO is now the obvious solution.
In addition, policy windows are also pushing autonomous driving companies toward IPO.
In Q4 2025, the first batch of L3 conditional autonomous vehicle admissions was officially granted in China, and this policy "landing" signaled to the market that there is a lawful path from tech investment to product monetization.
From a commercialization standpoint, companies really do need more capital at this stage.
Currently, technological improvements in end-to-end large models have dramatically enhanced the generalization ability of autonomous driving, and companies have transitioned from “demo competition” to “delivery competition.” Winning the scale battle means a need for massive secondary market funds as new ammunition.
However, the lively IPO scene contrasts with sober secondary market performance.
On November 6, 2025, Pony.ai and WeRide both listed on the HKEX: Pony.ai at HKD 139/share and WeRide at HKD 27.1/share. On debut, Pony.ai’s price dropped over 14% intraday and WeRide’s fell over 15%.
On December 19 of the same year, Xidi Zhijia (Mining Truck “First Autonomous Stock” founded by Prof. Li Zexiang of HKUST) debuted on the main board; on IPO day, its share price fell 13.69% from its issuance price, and its market cap broke below 10 billion HKD.
Even companies with the “first stock” halo in niche scenarios can’t escape the market’s overall cautious attitude toward autonomous driving valuations.
Looking at financial performance of already listed peer companies, losses remain the industry’s main theme.
Pony.ai’s 2025 revenue was 629 million RMB, up 20% YoY; net loss was 530 million RMB. WeRide’s 2025 revenue was 685 million RMB, up 89.6% YoY; net loss was 1.655 billion RMB.
Even for leading companies, losses persist. Horizon Robotics’ 2025 revenue was 3.758 billion RMB, up 57.7% YoY; R&D spending was 5.154 billion RMB, up 63.3% YoY, accounting for 137.1% of revenue. Adjusted operating loss was 2.372 billion RMB.
Therefore, the surge in autonomous driving IPOs is fundamentally due to companies’ inability to “generate their own blood” (profitable cash flow), requiring IPO fundraising to sustain operations and R&D.
After all, the track is evolving fast—from rule-based solutions to large models, end-to-end, and world models—requiring capital for each innovation and further pressing company finances.
03 What Exactly Is Capital Paying For?
Faced with so many autonomous driving investment targets, secondary market investors are becoming more pragmatic and picky than ever. Currently, the industry splits into three main camps, with capital buying logic focused differently for each.
The first is the L2+ mass production route for passenger vehicles, like Horizon Robotics. They mainly make money on “shipment volume,” riding the boom in Chinese NEV penetration, empowering OEMs as Tier-1 or Tier-2 suppliers.
These companies feature spectacular shipment volume and huge revenue, but under current intense price competition among carmakers, the profit margin of smart driving suppliers is heavily squeezed. The industry faces the pain points of "more revenue but not more profit" and "gross margin under pressure."
Another camp focuses on open road RoboTaxi, such as WeRide and Pony.ai.
They represent the technology peak, an industry ceiling, and capital buys in based on “future disruption” and final vision imagination.
However, extreme road conditions and long-tail scenarios in open environments are hard to completely solve, coupled with expensive vehicle hardware costs and heavy asset operation models, so the turning point for these companies to profitability remains far off. The market is willing to grant high valuations, but only to those with patience.
There’s also the closed/specific scenario commercial vehicle autonomous driving route, such as UISEE Technology in airports or factories.
This track is recognized by capital as having the shortest monetization cycle and clearest “economic accounting.” In airports and large manufacturing factories, vehicle routes are fixed, speed is limited, and legal restrictions are relatively lax. But the problem here is limited market size.
The industry expert commented: “Capital markets are now shifting. The market no longer just pays for future tech, returning to business fundamentals and accounting for industrial deployment.”
UISEE Technology’s HKEX application provides a representative case study for the commercialization of autonomous commercial vehicles in closed scenarios in China.
In 2026, autonomous driving storytelling has shed its previous frenzy and restlessness, becoming a hardcore business that demands careful calculation, in-depth focus on industry pain points, and real competition in globalization.
For the industry as a whole, 2026 marks a crucial watershed—at this story-less stage, whether companies can validate business models in specific scenarios, control loss magnitude, and provide clear profitability paths will determine who survives in the brutal knockout game.
Risk Warning and DisclaimerThe market has risks and investing requires caution. This article does not constitute personal investment advice nor does it consider the unique investment objectives, financial situation, or needs of individual users. Users should consider whether any opinions, views, or conclusions herein fit their specific circumstances. Investing based on this article is at your own risk. ```