BYD’s main brand takes a key step towards high-end positioning.

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Author | Zhou Zhiyu

Last year, BYD sold 4.6 million cars, ranking first globally in new energy vehicle sales for four consecutive years. However, in the high-end market, it has long struggled to find a breakthrough for its main brand.

In recent years, the task of moving upmarket was given to its sub-brands Denza, Yangwang, and Fangchengbao. But the scale of these sub-brands is ultimately limited and cannot leverage the overall profit structure. Although BYD leads domestic automakers in sales volume, its profits are moving in the opposite direction. The strategy of sacrificing price for volume has reached its limit, and BYD must find a brand-new breakthrough point.

On the evening of June 17, the Datang EV model under BYD’s Dynasty Network was launched, with its price reaching the 300,000 yuan level. This is the main brand's first direct entry into this price segment. According to Wallstreetcn, after Datang, other main models of BYD will also gradually launch high-end versions, such as the Han series, which will see the release of the "Da Han". The move upmarket for the main brand is not just about one car, but a systematic round of product upgrades.

But this first step is not easy. BYD has previously had unsuccessful attempts at moving its main brand upmarket, and the brand perception ceiling remains. Currently, the Datang has only released a pure electric version, and the delivery pace is restricted by the production ramp-up of the second-generation Blade Battery, so whether orders can smoothly translate into deliveries remains a question.

With domestic sales unlikely to rebound quickly in the short term, the effort by BYD to move its main brand upmarket is a crucial battle that must not be lost.

300,000 Yuan Anchor Point

BYD’s profit anxiety is well documented. Last year, profit per vehicle was 6,174 yuan, a year-on-year decrease of nearly 30%; in the first quarter of 2026, net profit dropped another 55% year-on-year to 4.085 billion yuan, and gross margin decreased from 22.31% to 20.49%.

At the June 9, 2026 shareholders’ meeting, BYD chairman Wang Chuanfu said: "Once we achieve upmarket success, gross margin and per-vehicle profit issues will naturally be resolved."

But until now, this statement had yet to find a specific undertaker at the main brand level.

The limitations of sub-brands moving upmarket are already apparent. Denza’s sales have fluctuated, ranging from about 5,000 to 16,000 vehicles per month over the past five months. The combined volume of Yangwang and Fangchengbao is even smaller. The three brands together sold 396,500 vehicles in 2025, up 104% year-on-year, but this is still less than 9% of total sales. Sub-brands can serve as benchmarks and establish an image, but improving the profitability of a 4.6-million-unit sales base still requires the main brand to raise the average price.

BYD’s average passenger car selling price in 2025 was about 119,200 yuan. Against this base, every vehicle sold above 250,000 yuan has a marked effect on raising the average price.

The Datang EV’s four models are priced from 239,900 to 309,900 yuan. Since pre-sales opened at the 2026 Beijing Auto Show, pre-orders have exceeded 150,000 units. If it can consistently sell in the 250,000 to 300,000 yuan range, this would improve the overall profit structure far more than the sub-brands selling a few thousand luxury cars.

BYD Dynasty Network has over 3,000 stores nationwide. A single Datang EV order can bring dealers as much profit as three or four Qin L’s, which is also crucial for the stability of the dealer network.

But it is also clear how difficult it is for the main brand to move upmarket. The Han L and Tang L, launched in April 2025, are cautionary examples: both models sold over 10,000 units in their first month, but heat quickly dissipated. Automobile wholesale data shows that by August 2025, Han L monthly sales had dropped below 2,300, and Tang L fell to about 3,700 units. In the first five months of this year, those figures dropped further to below 1,000.

An executive from a new EV brand’s marketing department told Wallstreetcn that consumer perception of the price of BYD's main brand is concentrated in the 150,000–200,000 yuan range and, due to insufficient brand premium, should product heat drop, the weakness is quickly exposed. Datang EV’s price is another step above Han L and Tang L, making brand perception even more challenging. Turning those first-month orders into deliveries isn't the issue; it's whether organic sales can be sustained after initial orders are digested. This is the real test of the brand premium.

The Datang EV is attempting to break through this ceiling with a leap in product definition. As a D-class full-size SUV, its body size, second-generation Blade Battery, and up to 950 km pure electric range targets today’s hottest “9 series” cars. The Tang L EV’s price is 229,800 to 289,800 yuan, and the Datang EV’s starting price is only 10,000 higher, but its positioning jumps from C-class to D-class, achieving the largest product leap for the smallest price difference. If consumers are willing to pay for this leap, it indicates that the main brand’s price ceiling can be broken, giving the market more confidence for future high-end launches.

Looking at the competitive landscape, there is currently no real high-volume contender in the 300,000 yuan-class pure electric large SUV market. The AITO M9 has cumulative sales of over 260,000 units, but its main price band is above 460,000 yuan and does not directly compete with the Datang EV, facing a different group of consumers.

The Li Auto L9’s sales trajectory is also unstable and its product advantage is built on range-extending technology; pure EV and range-extended buyers have clear differences. The Datang EV’s 950 km rear-wheel-drive version is priced at 269,900, and the four-wheel-drive version at 289,900 yuan—both likely to be the main sellers and precisely cutting into a weak spot in competitors’ price coverage.

Capacity Determines Success or Failure

Product positioning and pricing strategy are only the first step. Wang Chuanfu has publicly stated many times this year, "This year, the company's sales depend on battery capacity."

Wallstreetcn has learned that since mass production began for the second-gen Blade Battery at the end of last year, monthly capacity ramp-up has only reached 20,000 to 30,000 units, and is mainly supplied to BYD’s high-end models.

New models under BYD's Dynasty, Ocean, Denza, and Fangchengbao brands are all competing for this limited capacity. The Datang EV’s 950 km version requires even larger battery packs, so under the same capacity, the number of vehicles that can be allocated may be even less than for other models, thus extending the delivery cycle for high-volume variants. To retain potential buyers, Dynasty Network General Manager Lu Tian said that if delivery is not made within 30 days from locking in an order, for every extra day, buyers will receive a free day’s worth of fast-charging rights.

However, according to information disclosed by Wang Chuanfu at the shareholder meeting, the second-gen Blade Battery is currently increasing capacity by 20,000 to 30,000 units per month, and full release will not occur until next year.

The impact of limited capacity is already reflected in sales. From January to May 2026, BYD’s total sales were 1.405 million units, down 20.32% year-on-year, and domestic market share dropped from about 30% a year ago to 21.8%. Such a decline is rare in BYD’s recent history.

In May, domestic monthly sales reached 222,800 units, a 20% month-on-month increase, showing that the capacity bottleneck is being alleviated, but full release is still some way off. At this critical stage of ramp-up, the addition of the Datang EV to the queue is also a challenge for BYD's battery capacity.

If the high-end Datang EV suffers from long delivery cycles due to insufficient capacity, it will consume trust in the brand’s move upmarket. 300,000-yuan buyers are far less tolerant of waiting times than those paying 150,000. They have more alternative choices and will more readily turn to competitors if delivery is delayed.

Furthermore, after Datang, even more high-end models for the main brand are waiting to launch, so the pressure on capacity allocation will only increase. How to coordinate delivery priorities among the four brands amid these constraints will test BYD’s internal management capability.

Referring to the experience of Han L and Tang L, the heat window for a new BYD car is about three to four months. During this window, the new-car effect brings the greatest attention and showroom traffic; missing it is hard to recover from. If the Datang EV can maintain a monthly delivery pace of 5,000–6,000 units during this time, it can secure a place in the 300,000-yuan market, and also build trust for future flagships like the Da Han EV. Otherwise, if delivery can’t keep up with order digestion, the result will be another Han L or Tang L story.

For BYD, the Datang EV is not just about the fate of one model—it will define expectations for the main brand’s upmarket strategy.

BYD’s overseas business profit per car is about 20,000 yuan, several times that of its domestic business. International expansion allows it to make more money under the present structure, while upmarket moves will determine how high the profit ceiling in the domestic market can be raised—these are two entirely different paths.

For an automaker that sells nearly 5 million vehicles a year, whether its main brand can successfully sell cars priced at 300,000 yuan is more fundamental than any strategy involving sub-brands. The delivery numbers over the next three or four months will provide the answer. With even more high-end main brand models pending launch, the Datang EV’s report card will determine future plays.

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