"Bypassing" the Strait of Hormuz, Saudi oil exports have "recovered more than half," but can this "Plan B" be sustained?

After the Strait of Hormuz was almost closed, Saudi Arabia restored its oil exports to more than 60% of pre-war levels by using a 45-year-old pipeline that traverses the desert interior, providing a crucial buffer channel during what the International Energy Agency (IEA) calls "the largest supply disruption in oil market history." However, this bypass route is not exactly a safe path—it merely shifts risks from one choke point to another.

According to Bloomberg’s compiled vessel tracking data, in the past five days, Saudi crude exports from Yanbu, a Red Sea port, have averaged about 4.19 million barrels per day, roughly 60% of Saudi’s pre-war total exports of around 7 million barrels per day, a significant jump from Yanbu’s pre-war level of about 1.4 million barrels per day, with single-day peaks reaching 4.65 million barrels on three occasions. Reuters, citing LSEG shipping data, reports that Yanbu's loading in March is expected to reach a record 3.8 million barrels per day, with at least 32 supertankers and Suezmax tankers currently queued offshore awaiting loading, and more ships still en route.

Saudi Arabia is the only major Gulf oil producer with a substantial alternative export route. Its East-West Pipeline can transport up to 7 million barrels per day, allowing Saudi to independently maintain exports as neighboring Iraq and Kuwait are forced to drastically cut output. Saudi Aramco CEO Amin Nasser confirmed in early March that the pipeline would reach full capacity operation within days.

The core risk of this "Plan B" is that it moves the geopolitical exposure of oil exports from the Strait of Hormuz to the Bab al-Mandab Strait—this narrow waterway at the southern end of the Red Sea, with much of Yemen’s coastline controlled by Houthi forces. Analysts warn that if the Houthis intervene in the current conflict and disrupt Yanbu or Bab al-Mandab, global energy markets could come under renewed pressure.

Pipeline Acceleration: Chemicals Powering “Extreme Sprint”

The alternative route cited by Saudi is an east-west pipeline built in 1981, originally intended as a backup for oil exports during the Iran-Iraq war’s “tanker war” in the Gulf. Decision makers aimed to provide an export route should the Strait of Hormuz become untenable. This approximately 1,200-kilometer pipeline crosses the desert to the Red Sea port of Yanbu, with a total capacity of 7 million barrels per day—about 5 million barrels per day available for export, with the remainder supplying domestic refineries.

To quickly break physical limits, Aramco has taken additional measures. According to Reuters citing two industry sources, Aramco is injecting a chemical called "drag-reducing agent" (DRA) into the pipeline. This technology reduces internal fluid friction, boosting flow by over 30%, and was widely used by European operators during the sanctions shock on Russian oil. The sources say Saudi currently has ample stocks of this chemical.

Exports Climb: Saudi Has Exclusive “Backup Route”

Recent data shows this bypass route is already having a clear effect. Bloomberg's vessel tracking data indicates Yanbu’s exports have steadily risen since the conflict broke out, with March’s daily levels significantly higher than January’s 1.3 million barrels and February’s 1.4 million; about 70 tankers are expected to load at Yanbu this month, with roughly 40 still en route.

By contrast, other Gulf oil producers are in a far more passive position. The UAE has a pipeline running to the Gulf of Oman, but its terminal at Fujairah has repeatedly suspended operations due to drone attacks, undermining its stability. Iraq and Kuwait have virtually no alternative routes, and have been forced to cut production. The IEA has classified this conflict as the largest supply disruption ever in the oil market, and Saudi’s pipeline has become the single most crucial infrastructure underpinning the global energy market.

New Choke Point: Geopolitical Risks at Bab al-Mandab

The east-west pipeline successfully bypassed Hormuz, but steered exports into another geopolitically sensitive area.

About 90% of crude oil loaded at Yanbu sails on very large crude carriers (VLCCs). Fully loaded, these tankers are too deep-drafted to use the Suez Canal and must go south through Bab al-Mandab to reach Asia and other major markets. Analysts estimate about 70% to 75% of Yanbu’s crude exports are exposed to risks associated with Bab al-Mandab. According to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), about 6% of global seaborne oil passes through this waterway.

Eurasia Group senior analyst and Iran oil historian Gregory Brew said, “The Houthi threat is very real. If they attack Yanbu and cause enough damage, you are facing a loss of 7 million barrels per day in exports,” he said.

Some exports can avoid Bab al-Mandab via another route—from Yanbu north to Egypt’s Ain Sukhna port, then through the Sumed pipeline to the Mediterranean. Analysts estimate this channel can handle about 2 to 2.5 million barrels per day, but it’s far from enough for all Yanbu exports. According to the latest Western naval JMIC data, vessel traffic in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab has returned to normal historical levels, with about 40 ships passing through in the last 24 hours, and no new security incidents reported.

Houthis: Strategic Restraint or Standby Intervention?

The Houthi forces have not officially declared involvement in the current conflict, but their leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi made a clear statement in a televised speech on March 5th: “With regard to military escalation and actions, our fingers are always on the trigger, and we can act whenever the situation requires.”

Analysts are divided on why the Houthis have so far stayed out. Ahmed Nagi, senior Yemen analyst at the International Crisis Group, believes it’s a deliberate, strategic restraint, not lack of capability. “Iran seems to be managing the situation gradually, keeping the Houthis as a reserve force,” Nagi said, “In this sense, the Houthis are a critical card to play later, especially given their ability to disrupt Red Sea shipping and create broader economic and security pressure.” He added, “Their restraint at present looks more like a matter of timing, not unwillingness to join the fight.”

Gregory Brew offered another perspective based on the Houthis’ own situation: after U.S. and Israeli strikes, the Houthis’ military strength has been considerably depleted, and their finances are under pressure. “I think their current financial and military situation will temper their willingness to launch large-scale hostile operations,” he said.

Both views point to one reality: For the global energy market, the stability of Bab al-Mandab is increasingly becoming the key variable for the sustainability of Saudi oil’s “Plan B,”—and this is precisely something Riyadh cannot control alone.

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