"De-CATLization" is easier said than done; JPMorgan Chase: Narrowing the technology gap does not mean the disappearance of competitive advantage, CATL remains the first choice.
CATL's stock price was severely impacted by the "de-CATL" deal in September, but a 60-page in-depth research report released by JPMorgan Chase argues that the market has seriously misjudged this narrative. The report points out that investors are overly focused on narrowing the technology gap, while underestimating the strategic value of scale, execution, quality, consumer trust, and financial resilience—which are precisely the core of CATL's structural leadership.
According to a JPMorgan report, CATL's A/H shares fell 19% in September, while second-tier suppliers Sunwoda surged 28%, Gotion rose 11%, CALB rose 2%, and EVE fell 5% during the same period. CATL's performance significantly lagged behind the CSI 300 Index (-6%). However, amidst the clamor surrounding the "de-CATL" deal, CATL's market share in China's passenger vehicle electric vehicle battery market bucked the trend, increasing by 3 percentage points year-on-year to 44% in the first eight months of this year, and reaching 56% excluding BYD.

JPMorgan Chase maintains its "Overweight" rating on CATL's A-shares and H-shares, with a target price of RMB 520 for A-shares (based on a 2027 forward P/E ratio of 20.5x) and a target price of HKD 725 for H-shares (based on a 2027 forward P/E ratio of 24x). The report notes that CATL's A-shares are currently trading at a 2027 forward P/E ratio of 11.5x, lower than the historical valuation low reached briefly in January 2024 (11.6 to 12.0x), while the CSI 300 Index was approximately 20% lower at that time. JPMorgan Chase projects CATL's 2027 earnings per share growth to exceed 20%, ROE to exceed 25%, free cash flow yield to approximately 10%, and total shareholder return to reach 5% to 6%.
Diversified procurement does not mean permanent loss of market share.
Market concerns about OEMs diversifying their battery suppliers are one of the core logics behind the "de-CATL" deal. JPMorgan Chase believes this logic ignores the complexity of historical experience.
Taking NIO as an example, after CALB entered the supply chain, CATL's market share in the NIO brand once dropped from 87% in 2023 to 60% in 2025, but subsequently rebounded to 77% in the first eight months of this year, while CALB's market share plummeted from 29% in 2024 to 6%. Similar market share rebounds also occurred with Geely and GAC—CATL's market share in Geely rebounded from 53% in 2024 to 58% in the first eight months of this year, and its market share in GAC Motor rose from 20% in 2024 to 25% in the first eight months of this year. At the same time, CATL also achieved a breakthrough in Leapmotor, increasing its market share from less than 1% to over 20%.
JPMorgan Chase points out that Xiaomi's upcoming SkyNomad/Pengcheng SUV platform will use CALB and Sunwoda batteries, raising concerns in the market about automakers "de-CATL-izing." However, according to GGII data, Xiaomi and Li Auto each account for only 3% to 4% of CATL's total shipments, so the direct impact is limited. More importantly, battery supplier diversification is usually a gradual process spanning multiple vehicle platforms and product cycles, rather than a one-off supplier replacement.
OEMs' self-developed batteries: Scale barriers are difficult to overcome
Automakers' self-developed batteries are seen as a long-term threat to CATL, but JPMorgan believes that this risk is overestimated by the market.
The scale gap is the core obstacle . CATL's shipments will exceed 660 GWh in 2025, while the shipments of major second-tier suppliers will only be 40 to 120 GWh, and the shipments of most OEMs' self-developed battery projects will be less than 10 GWh. This scale gap is between 30 and 100 times, which directly translates into a comprehensive advantage in terms of raw material procurement bargaining power, capacity utilization rate, unit depreciation burden, manufacturing yield, and R&D efficiency.
The self-developed battery practices of major global automakers also confirm this judgment. Tesla's 4680 battery mass production target announced at its 2020 Battery Day still amounts to less than 10 GWh of internal production by 2025, accounting for less than 4% of its total electric vehicle battery consumption. Volkswagen's plan for six European battery factories announced in 2021 shows that only the Salzgitter factory is close to production readiness by 2026, indicating a significant delay in overall progress.
Recent industry developments further indicate that the market is evolving towards collaboration rather than complete vertical integration. CATL's acquisition of Geely's battery manufacturing assets (a joint venture in which CATL holds a 51% stake), and Volkswagen's PowerCo's expansion of its strategic partnership with Gotion—the latter explicitly citing Gotion's industrial manufacturing expertise as a core reason for the collaboration—both point to the same conclusion: the scaled operation of battery manufacturing is more challenging than automakers anticipated.
After technological convergence, competition shifts to execution and quality.
JPMorgan Chase acknowledges that over the past five years, second-tier suppliers have significantly narrowed the gap with CATL in terms of lithium iron phosphate battery energy density and fast-charging performance, with 800V architecture and 5C charging platforms becoming increasingly common. However, the report argues that convergence in technical specifications does not equate to convergence in the competitive landscape.
As battery technology matures, the focus of competition is shifting from specifications to manufacturing consistency, degradation performance, safety, reliability, and real-world performance. CATL currently holds a 76% share of the Chinese NCM battery market and dominates the supply for many high-end electric vehicle platforms. In terms of next-generation technology, CATL's condensed matter batteries lead the industry among commercially available semi-solid-state battery products with a pack-level energy density exceeding 270Wh/kg.
The tail effects of quality risks are also significant. The report cites several quality incidents involving second-tier suppliers: Sunwoda's battery cells supplied to Geely's VREMT were found to have quality defects, leading to a recall of 38,277 affected vehicles by Zeekr, with Sunwoda paying a settlement of 608 million yuan; CALB's 177Ah lithium iron phosphate batteries were confirmed by GAC Aion to have issues with cell swelling and liquid leakage; and EVE's 169Ah lithium iron phosphate batteries also received multiple complaints. In contrast, CATL's cumulative warranty provisions from 2019 to 2023 accounted for approximately 3% of its revenue, the highest among domestic peers, but its actual recall costs were only about 0.25%, also the lowest in the industry.
Brand effect: Consumer perception becomes a new moat
According to the NielsenIQ (NIQ) 2026 Global New Energy Vehicle Consumer Survey Report cited by JPMorgan Chase, battery brands are evolving from purely B2B procurement decisions into a key factor influencing consumers' willingness to purchase vehicles.
Research shows that 79% of global consumers said a well-known battery brand would increase their willingness to purchase a car, and 76% were willing to pay a premium for vehicles equipped with high-quality batteries. CATL ranks first in brand awareness in both China and overseas markets. Its Brand Strength Index (BSI) in the Chinese market is three times that of BYD, and its BSI in overseas markets is approximately twice that of LGES. Notably, 37% of Chinese consumers indicated that they would reconsider their purchase decision if their preferred model did not use CATL batteries.
Early data from the used car market also provides corroborating evidence. According to used car market quotes in China, vehicles equipped with CATL batteries can command a premium of 5% to 10% compared to similar models, ages, and mileage vehicles using other brands of batteries, with some cases even reaching as high as 40%. The market share trend of the Li Auto i6 is also highly correlated with CATL's supply share—CATL's supply share in the i6 decreased from 100% in the first quarter of 2026 to approximately 60% in the third quarter, while during the same period, the model's share in the C-segment pure electric vehicle market fell from a peak of 12% to approximately 7% to 8%.
The gap in profitability quality is far greater than the surface figures suggest.
JPMorgan Chase's financial analysis revealed a key fact overlooked by the market: CATL's accounting policies are the most conservative among its domestic peers, resulting in a systematic underestimation of its true profitability in its reported profits.
Specifically, CATL's warranty provisions exceed 3% of revenue, far higher than the average of less than 2% for its second-tier domestic peers; its fixed asset depreciation period is approximately 5 years, while most second-tier peers use 8 to 12 years; and its R&D expenditures are 100% expensed, while most peers capitalize 5% to 20%. JPMorgan Chase estimates that if CATL adopted accounting practices similar to its second-tier peers, its reported net profit would increase by approximately 30%. Conversely, if second-tier battery manufacturers adopted CATL's accounting standards, all second-tier Chinese suppliers would incur losses.

The gap in financial resilience is equally significant. CATL is the only company in China's battery industry that consistently generates free cash flow and maintains a net cash balance sheet, while most second-tier suppliers have high leverage ratios, weak profitability, and continuous cash burn. Government subsidies accounted for over 30% of the net profit reported by second-tier suppliers in the first half of 2026, while for CATL it was only about 10%. JPMorgan Chase analysis shows that, at the current rate of capital expenditure and cash burn, the cash reserves of some second-tier suppliers can only support them for 2 to 5 quarters.
European policy risks are manageable; the establishment of a factory in Hungary boosts confidence.
Discussions on EU policy to promote the localization of the battery supply chain, as well as licensing and operational uncertainties surrounding the Sino-Hungarian battery project, are another factor recently suppressing CATL's valuation. JPMorgan Chase believes that the relevant risks are overestimated by the market.
The core logic lies in the supply-demand gap. JPMorgan Chase estimates that by 2028, the EU's demand for electric vehicle and energy storage batteries will be more than double its local cell production capacity, and Europe will remain structurally dependent on imported batteries for the foreseeable future. Therefore, even if the EU Industrial Action Plan (IAA) is ultimately implemented, it is expected to include implementation flexibility and a multi-year transition period.
Meanwhile, CATL's Phase I factory in Hungary officially entered the trial production stage on September 22, alleviating concerns about project execution and strengthening its localization strategy in Europe. CATL currently holds over 40% market share in Europe, roughly equivalent to its share in China. Future growth in its European business will rely more on overall market expansion and local capacity ramp-up than on further market share increases.
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