GAC "tightens its belt"
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Author | Chai Xuchen
Editor | Zhou Zhiyu
From once being the favored "no cap on investment" child, to now being merged into the Aion business unit, the gears of Hyper's fate are turning once again.
On December 18th, GAC Group announced the launch of its proprietary brand BU reform. Among these, the most eye-catching is the merger of Hyper and Aion, with both to be jointly managed under the same business unit.
From Hyper’s debut three years ago, to its separation from Aion this January, and now its reintegration, the coming together and splitting apart of Hyper and Aion has been closely tied to the fate of GAC Group.
Hyper was originally a sub-brand of Aion targeting the high-end market and was once the most important “valuation increment” in GAC Aion’s independent IPO story, carrying high hopes of being the “Chinese Porsche.” Six months ago, the group also stated, “Over the next three years, GAC will support Hyper without upper limit, investing the group’s top human, material, and financial resources into Hyper.”
Thus, when the Hyper brand was first founded, GAC brought in the group’s most advanced technologies—such as the Xingling platform and solid-state batteries—trying to quickly establish itself in the high-end 300,000+ yuan market through technological stacking. After a show of strength, Hyper also mainly promoted the 200,000 yuan Hyper GT and Hyper HT.
However, over the past two years, Hyper’s sales have not met expectations. From January to November this year, Hyper sold a total of 15,483 new cars, down about 3% year-on-year. In the same period, Aion sold 247,900 new cars, a year-on-year drop of 19.29%. The average monthly sales are about 23,000 units—far below its peak of over 50,000 per month.
Currently, facing pressure on sales, shrinking profits, and the industry-wide normalization of price wars, operating Hyper as an independent brand is no longer cost-effective for GAC, who is now going through tough times, and the group has no choice but to “tighten its belt” and prepare for a counterattack.
At the recent GAC Group 2026 work conference held at the Panyu headquarters, GAC Group Chairman Feng Xingya made it clear that to cope with operational difficulties: short-term rely on sales, medium-term on products, and long-term on reform. The group reform is to be advanced in a 2+3+X stage, with top-level design of organizational processes and BU pilot already completed; the next step is to push into deep-water areas of reform. The “BU pilot” refers specifically to the Hyper Aion BU.
According to industry insiders, in the past, the GAC Research Institute, Aion Research Institute, and individual brands had a certain “siloed” development model. Hyper and Aion overlapped in chassis, battery pack, and even some aspects of software definition, “reinventing the wheel.” During the market boom, “having more kids means better fighting” might have worked, but in today’s stock competition, this model inevitably causes internal friction.
Under the reformed BU system, R&D, production, and supply chain will be further integrated. One team, two brands, maximizing supply chain leverage and lowering BOM costs—this is the only way to deal with continued price wars. This reform is essentially a strategic contraction from “expansion priority” to “efficiency priority,” and is also intended to build a clearer brand defense front.
Especially in the core functional departments for strategy, products, R&D, quality, sales, marketing, finance, and HR, all will be unified. Ultimately, the Aion BU will independently take responsibility for the entire process from product planning, R&D, launch to profit, and will be fully responsible for market performance and commercial success.
After the merger, Aion can use Hyper’s high-end technology for brand endorsement, elevating its image; while Hyper can leverage Aion’s massive user base for replacement and conversion.
It’s worth noting that the most immediate result of this reform is channel integration. GAC clearly stated that Hyper will utilize Aion’s channel resources, aiming to surpass 1,000 sales outlets by 2026. Originally, Hyper had only about 200 stores, but after merging into Aion’s channel, it instantly gained deep access into lower-tier cities.
Many companies have tightened their belts and restructured in the past year. Just like how Zeekr split from the Lynk & Co system to operate independently, then eventually brought the two closer again, these are all moves adapting to market evolution. As China’s auto market enters the stock competition phase, the battle is not just about products, but about system capability. Resource sharing, collaborative development, and efficiency improvement are necessities for auto companies’ development.
It’s clear GAC’s reform direction is getting clearer. The current auto market shows a layered characteristic of “high-end upgrading and popular affordability.” GAC’s “complementary combination” strategy not only covers different consumer needs, but also avoids resource dispersion and effectively enhances overall market risk resistance.
Because of this, the Hyper Aion BU leads the way, followed by the Trumpchi BU, and combined with the Qijing brand developed in conjunction with Huawei and operated independently, GAC’s proprietary brands will ultimately form a matrix covering each market segment.
This group army operation model is a precise response to market stratification: Hyper Aion BU plays the role of “Toyota + Lexus.” Among them, Aion is responsible for volume, maintaining market share, while Hyper is responsible for technological monetization and brand elevation by sharing modular platforms and spreading costs.
Meanwhile, the Trumpchi BU focuses on plug-in and hybrid, serving as GAC’s “cash cow” and “ballast stone” as pure electric penetration growth slows, ensuring the group’s basic position in the fuel/hybrid market; while the Qijing brand is the breakthrough point—since Hyper, internally incubated, cannot overtake rivals in intelligence in the short term, introducing Qijing is a clever “using external force for leverage.”
If this set of combination punches is executed well, GAC will be able to hold its ground in the 2026 finals.
Next year, the Hyper Aion BU plans to launch six new models. In the latest MIIT list, the Aion N60 has officially debuted. The Hyper A800 jointly developed by Hyper and Huawei will also be launched soon.
To ease performance pressure, GAC has implemented a series of initiatives. In addition to this proprietary brand BU reform, GAC has also adopted Huawei’s IPD system. Feng Xingya said this system has already shown results: new product development cycles have shortened from 30 months to 18-24 months, and product development costs have dropped by 10% year-on-year, laying the foundation for accelerating product iteration.
With this series of reforms completed, and the first Qijing vehicle to be launched mid-next year, GAC will also follow the three-year “Panyu Action” plan and strive to reach 2 million annual sales of proprietary brands by 2027.
Looking back, GAC’s previous “no cap” investment in Hyper was courage; the current restraint in “merging similar projects” is wisdom. In the industry’s cold winter, keeping the spark alive for another surge may be more important than anything else.
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