Hormuz "can't go back to the way it was," but will "gradually fade away."

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The United States and Iran reached an agreement on Tuesday night for a two-week temporary ceasefire, pressing pause on a conflict that has lasted six weeks.

In his latest article, Bloomberg columnist Javier Blas points out that the strategic status of the Strait of Hormuz has permanently changed. With the expansion of alternative pipeline infrastructure, Iran's grip on the global energy supply will gradually weaken over time.

The confrontation, commonly referred to as the "Hormuz War" by the outside world, has thrown the shipping routes of one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas into turmoil. While the ceasefire agreement has come into effect, the future status of the strait remains uncertain, and the volatility in oil and gas markets has not subsided.

Javier Blas notes that regardless of how the US and Iran’s ceasefire statements are interpreted, one fact is indisputable: the status of the Strait of Hormuz has changed. This waterway was freely accessible before the war, but now it has at least become a regulated channel. As of Wednesday morning, few ships were crossing the strait, and Tehran’s signal was clear—passage requires Iran’s approval.

The Strait’s Status Has Changed, Hard to Return to Pre-War Conditions

Blas believes that while there is a possibility for the Strait of Hormuz to return to its pre-war status—i.e., essentially following the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, allowing free and untaxed passage—he is skeptical about it.

He points out that neither the US nor Iran have ratified the UN treaty, although both had largely followed parts of it in practice. This means both countries have room to rearrange the strait’s jurisdictional rules.

Trump insists on "complete, immediate, and safe" passage through the strait, but at the same time reposted an Iranian statement on social media—the statement shows that passage is currently restricted and under Iranian military control. This contradiction reflects the fundamental tension of demands at the negotiating table.

Bosphorus and Danish Straits Offer Negotiation Templates

Blas believes solutions may be found by referring to treaties governing other major maritime chokepoints. The 1857 "Sound Toll Redemption Treaty" still regulates passage through the Danish Strait, stipulating that Denmark "supervises" piloting services, giving it actual jurisdiction, but these services are not mandatory—in name Denmark controls the channel, but its real rights are quite limited.

The Bosphorus Strait offers another template. Under the 1936 "Montreux Convention", Turkey defined the strait as having "freedom of passage", but this freedom "should not be interpreted as ‘free and unregulated’ passage". Turkish authorities manage shipping and charge piloting fees.

Blas points out that such seemingly contradictory wording is precisely the art of diplomacy—fees can be given a politically acceptable name, such as "pilotage fee" or "oil spill prevention fee"; Iran can obtain what it wants on paper, but in reality, if most ships turn to Omani waters, Tehran may not receive a single cent.

Iran Gains New Strategic Confidence, but Its Advantage Will Fade Over Time

Blas emphasizes that for Iran, retaining some control over the strait is vital, as it strengthens its deterrence against future attacks by Israel and the US. But the deeper impact is this: the past six weeks have been a practical lesson in energy geopolitics, giving Iran a new recognition of its own strategic strength—this "hard knowledge" will not disappear regardless of the outcome of negotiations.

Previously, Iran assumed the Strait of Hormuz gave it leverage to influence the international economy, but its actual effectiveness had never been tested. Now, Tehran knows: whether it can close the strait in wartime, how long it can hold it, how the US and international community will respond, and how oil and gas markets will react. These answers cannot be erased by any negotiation.

However, Blas also notes that Iran’s neighbors have learned important geopolitical lessons from this conflict, which will gradually weaken Tehran’s strategic advantage. Saudi Arabia and the UAE have managed to bypass this chokepoint to some extent through their own alternative pipelines and will almost certainly expand these emergency pipelines. Kuwait may join Saudi Arabia in building its own alternative pipeline; Iraq, despite limited funds, is highly motivated to rebuild its old strategic pipeline to the Mediterranean via Turkey.

Blas’s conclusion: Iran’s grip on energy supply will loosen over time. In five years, the Persian Gulf will have far more developed alternatives than today. No matter what agreement the US and Iran reach about the future of Hormuz, the strategic status of the strait has changed—it will never again be as critically important to the global economy as it was six weeks ago when the conflict broke out.

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