“Private equity tycoons” pushed into a corner

```

As the frenzy sweeps through the market, a group of once "investment kings" silently retreat to the sidelines in the quiet.

Their net value curves run counter to the boiling market, as if they are in a parallel universe.

Their views are still followed, but gradually seem to become the target of market "diss".

Those prominent names and once sought-after products now gradually fall to the bottom of the performance rankings of hundred-billion private funds. And this has happened repeatedly over the past three years.

This has not only surprised investors, but of course also triggered many voices of doubt.

The investment masters once regarded as legends, those shining stars before 2021, have been swept into the corner by the tide of the market.

Can these people, who "persevere" so much, regain their former glory?

What happened to you? Big shots

In December 1999, at the climax of the last century's craziest internet stock boom, Barron's published a cover story titled "What's Wrong, Warren (Buffett)", discussing Buffett's underperformance over the past year or so.

In that internet stock-dominated market, a group of investors who stuck to their stock style all struggled—including Buffett, Tiger Fund's Robertson, and Quantum Fund's Druckenmiller (before turning bullish).

Similar situations have happened to some domestic investment masters, such as Linyuan and Dan Bin.

Looking at the ranking of hundred-billion private funds over the past year, many of Linyuan Investment’s products are at the bottom, with the market frenzy seemingly unrelated to this well-known institution.

According to third-party data platforms, as of September 30, 2025, the CSI 300 Index rose by 15.50% over the past year. Yet, Linyuan Investment XX's net value saw a double-digit drawdown.

This positive versus negative spread has stretched over 30 percentage points apart.

Perfectly Missed?

Judging by net value performance, some of Linyuan's products almost "perfectly" missed the past year's rally. Especially after the second quarter of this year, when hot stocks were performing strongly, Linyuan's products’ net value went in the opposite direction.

This is not just Linyuan's “trouble”.

Looking at active equity private fund firms of 5 billion yuan or above, there have been basically two paths in the past year.

Either actively or passively keep up with the market trend—those skilled in consumer stock investing jumped into new consumption, sector rotation believers pursued the big tech cycle, falling in love with robots, AI, semiconductors.

Or stick to their previous types and investment logic—but face much pressure.

Linyuan and the others have clearly chosen the latter.

Heavily invested in “old consumption”?

When main funds chase AI, semiconductors, and new energy, Linyuan's products are still heavily positioned in his few “old-fashioned” consumer stocks, almost “turning a blind eye” to emerging technology fields.

This can be seen as persistence, or as obsession.

According to quantitative analysis reports from sales channels, the industries contributing negatively to Linyuan product net values are precisely traditional sectors like food and beverage, pharmaceuticals, and retail. His heavy holdings seem "nailed" to the traditional fields Linyuan is familiar with.

Among them, the food and beverage companies heavily held by Linyuan stand out, becoming the most obviously negative contributors to net value.

Channel analysis further shows that although Linyuan's holdings in utilities, electronics, steel, and banking positively contributed to net value, the total returns from these industries were still not enough to offset the losses suffered in the single sector of food and beverage.

Where does the "obsession" come from

But Linyuan has his logic for doing this.

Looking at Linyuan’s public statements this year, we can sort out the internal logic of his persistence with “old brands”:

First, he has repeatedly emphasized the investment concept of “long-term heavy positions, buy and never sell, never ever sell.”

This means his investment framework is built on the underlying logic of “lifetime holding,” with extremely stringent selection criteria for holdings, which may, however, overlook industry cycle changes.

Second, he has explicitly said he is bullish on the "elderly economy" sectors like Chinese medicine, predicting that their compound annual growth rate over the next decade will approach or exceed double digits.

This means his allocation in the pharmaceuticals sector is based on a long-term growth outlook for specific subdivisions, but this view is facing stern market reality tests.

Third, he confidently points out the baijiu sector is still undervalued, believing “China’s liquor culture, thousands of years old, will not disappear, as drinking brings people happiness.”

This means his persistence in food and beverage has gone beyond financial analysis, rising to the level of cultural confidence and human needs.

Fourth, he especially mentions A-shares’ dividend yield advantage, believing that funds will continue to flow into food and beverage (which he calls the “mouth business”), utilities, and other industries with stable dividend yields.

This means his allocation logic leans toward high yield, stable cash flow assets, forming a sharp contrast to current market preference for growth.

Fifth, this year Linyuan also mentioned that he is "not confident" in investing in tech stocks, that it’s hard to predict future leaders, “It’s not that I don’t want to invest. It’s that I can’t make this money.”

This idea is actually very easy to understand. Market style will inevitably switch, just like bank stocks can also perform strongly for two consecutive years.

If you shift positions at this moment, and the style does switch, you’ll face an even bigger test.

A Dilemma

But at the same time, such a choice brings enormous pressure.

Especially, if a single market style refuses to switch for a long time, then fund managers who “hold their ground” may face more and more of a predicament—until forced into a corner.

During the U.S. internet stock boom in the last century, there was a “painful” case: Tiger Fund's Robertson liquidated his hedge fund—once the world's largest—months before the internet bubble peaked.

Yet, in the same month he completed the liquidation, U.S. market style really switched.

So, this is a dilemma.

Besides the dilemma, style itself may be the issue.

Like many first-generation successful managers, Linyuan’s investment system was established years ago. With early insight into the structural changes in China's economy in the 1990s-2000s, they heavily invested in traditional tracks like consumption and earned huge returns amid the tides of the era.

This “belief” born of success forms the fundamental color of Linyuan’s “obsession” today: on the one hand, extreme confidence in his “buy and hold” system; on the other, instinctive distance from the market’s noisy new tracks.

This detachment is being severely tested as structural markets intensify.

To some extent, Linyuan’s products now seem like ships sailing old routes. As newcomers and veterans dance on the new routes, those sticking to the old ones are carried ever further away by the waves.

The “Footnotes” of Peers

According to collations by Private Placement PaiPai.com, in the “reverse” rankings of hundred-billion private fund products (past year), another "big name" is right next to Linyuan’s products.

That is Dan Bin of Oriental Harbor, who has been riding high in recent years—not only taking the championship for hundred-billion private funds last year but also becoming a “staunch bull” for AI investment in mainland China.

However, the performance of Dan Bin’s products has diverged. His top products’ annual returns exceeded 25 percentage points, while others under his name only achieved 12% in the same period, lagging significantly behind the CSI 300 Index.

Dan Bin’s underperforming products give investors the feeling that he “underweighted” the U.S. AI sector.

As industry common sense goes, a fund manager will not allocate all products to the highest risk and return tracks, but must consider sources of funds, client risk tolerance, and channel compliance requirements.

Viewed this way, Dan Bin’s weaker products—which have joined Linyuan’s at the bottom over the past year—may be samples of his A-share portfolio, or perhaps examples of his “traditional thinking.”

After all, both Linyuan and Dan Bin made fortunes early on from baijiu investments.

In 2000, after enduring the storm of “universal criticism”, Buffett finally waited out the style switch. But Robertson, constrained by capital, drank the “bitter wine” of personality. This time, where will the perseverance of the big players lead?

Risk Warning and DisclaimerThe market entails risks, and caution should be exercised with investments. This article does not constitute personal investment advice, nor does it take into account the unique investment objectives, financial circumstances, or needs of individual users. Users should consider whether any opinions, views, or conclusions in this article suit their individual circumstances. Investment decisions based on this carry their own risk. ```