Renault, absent from China, has created a set of Chinese-style tactics.

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Author | Zhou Zhiyu

Less than a year into his tenure, Renault Group CEO Luca de Meo has overhauled the strategic blueprint left by his predecessor. The mobility brand Mobilize has been scaled back, the spin-off plan for the electric vehicle division Ampere has been halted, and the high-performance electric motor development project with Valeo has been terminated in favor of Chinese suppliers.

On March 10 local time, the former procurement chief-turned-CEO revealed his hand—the futuREady strategy. By 2030, Renault aims to launch 36 new models, maintain an operating profit margin of 5%-7% with an annual automotive free cash flow of no less than 1.5 billion euros. These figures themselves are not surprising.

The interesting part is the frame of reference for this strategy.

Luca de Meo stated something rarely expressed so directly at a European automaker's strategic release: "Our goal is to be on par with Chinese carmakers in terms of innovation capability, cost efficiency, and development speed." A two-year development cycle, 40% reduction in pure electric platform costs, 350 humanoid robots entering factories—each KPI clearly references Chinese benchmarks.

Renault has exited the Chinese passenger car market for many years. In 2025, its global sales are projected at 2.236 million units, with €57.9 billion in revenue and a 6.3% operating profit margin. Though not large in scale, its choice is clear: China is not its market, but rather its source of methodology and components. This makes futuREady an interesting case sample—how a European automaker, without directly participating in the Chinese market, builds an entire strategy based on "benchmarking against China."

An Underestimated Strategic Choice

During the Q&A, a frequently asked question was raised to Luca de Meo: Since you’re not returning to the Chinese market, what role does China play in your plan?

Luca de Meo didn’t beat around the bush. He listed three things: continue developing models in China, including leveraging Geely’s GEA platform for overseas markets; procure components from China to serve European production; and maintain cooperation with Chinese suppliers and the ecosystem.

All three point to one logic—serving non-Chinese markets with Chinese capabilities.

This choice is rare among multinational automakers. Volkswagen is still investing tens of billions of euros in the Chinese market to catch up with the pace of local brands in intelligence, and Stellantis, though scaling back its joint ventures in China, has been reluctant to fully exit. Renault chose a different path: to step out of the Chinese battleground and focus resources on Europe, India, and Latin America.

One phrase from Luca de Meo’s strategy speech revealed his underlying consideration: "We do not face the major uncertainties that participants in the Chinese and US markets do." For an automaker with annual revenue of over €50 billion, not competing directly in the world's two largest markets translates to a cleaner balance sheet and a more focused allocation of resources.

But Renault is not completely "de-sinicized." A few months ago, Renault terminated the high-performance electric motor development project with Valeo in favor of Chinese suppliers. The Twingo E-Tech electric, which went from concept to production in 22 months, emerged at such speed largely thanks to support from Chinese suppliers and Renault’s Shanghai R&D center ACDC.

This means that even a European automaker deliberately keeping its distance from the Chinese market cannot fully bypass China's cost advantage. Luca de Meo himself admitted: "The components they provide allow us to be competitive."

"China Speed," Made in Europe

The hardest set of numbers in futuREady are almost a copy of Chinese automakers’ capabilities.

Development cycle compressed to two years. Luca de Meo cited the Twingo case: 22 months, completed in China. He then said the current challenge is to "replicate this speed at the technology center in France, using European suppliers." The subtext is clear—what China can do, we must also do in Europe.

Then there's the pure electric platform. Renault announced the specs of its RGEV Medium 2.0 platform: 800V architecture, cell-to-body integration, 20% reduction in components, rare-earth-free electrically excited synchronous motors, 20% reduction in power electronics cost. Pure EV version with WLTP range up to 750 km, range-extended version with combined range of 1,400 km. The overall target is a 40% cost reduction compared to the current-generation EV.

This combination benchmarks the efficiencies accumulated by China’s EV supply chain in recent years. The platform is mainly developed in France, and the first model to use it in mass production will run an Android in-car OS jointly developed with Google—Renault is leveraging Europe’s engineering base with the world’s best technology resources, a line of thinking much like the supply chain integration "pragmatism" employed by Chinese automakers.

The factory side also benchmarks Chinese efficiency. 350 humanoid robots on the production line, AI-driven full-process quality inspection covering over 1,000 control points, industrial metaverse digital twins, factory downtime halved, energy consumption down 25%, global production costs down 20%. Variable cost per car down about €400 annually, upfront investment cost for new projects down 40%, logistics costs down 30%.

But the tension is also clear. When asked if Renault would embark on mass layoffs like Volkswagen, Luca de Meo responded no, but would maintain transparency with labor unions. He also promised manufacturing presence in Europe would remain stable through 2030, with manufacturing in France up 30% compared to the prior cycle.

This is the structural tension between Chinese speed and European reality. Luca de Meo is well aware of the difficulty. He said compressing the development cycle from five years to two is a "paradigm shift." Someone asked, "Do you know how to do it?" He replied: "Yes, we did it with the Twingo—but that was in China. Can we do it in Europe? That’s our ambition."

Wallstreetcn has learned from insiders that as Renault Group's former head of procurement, Luca de Meo frequently uses Chinese manufacturers as examples in discussions with employees, demonstrating the kind of agility and efficiency Renault should strive to achieve.

A New Growth Narrative

Benchmarking China in technology, but sidestepping China for growth. futuREady puts the other half of its growth bet on markets outside Europe.

The goal for the Renault brand is global sales of over 2 million units by 2030, half of which from outside Europe. But in 2025, sales outside Europe are only 620,000 units. That’s nearly a twofold increase in four years—a steep curve.

India is the cornerstone of this narrative. Renault has been deeply rooted in India for 15 years, boasting a complete local value chain. Luca de Meo positions India as a "global hub," not only servicing the local market but also serving as a production and export center for international markets. The Bridger concept car presented at the launch is the embodiment—a B-segment SUV under 4 meters long, supporting gasoline, hybrid, and electric versions, scheduled for debut in India before the end of 2027.

To some extent, Renault is using India for what Chinese automakers used China for: a low-cost manufacturing base doubling as an export platform. Latin America and Korea are the other two pivots, and the market size covered by the three hubs is "equivalent to Europe."

But this narrative has its fragility. BYD’s overseas sales target in 2026 is 1.3 million units, and Geely has anchored its export sales target at 640,000 this year. Chinese automakers are accelerating their presence in the target markets Renault is eyeing, from Latin America to Southeast Asia to the Middle East, putting pressure on Renault’s international growth prospects.

The home front in Europe is under strain too. Renault’s target for the European market is 100% electrified sales—50% pure electric and 50% full hybrids. This combination itself is a response to carbon emission regulations.

When asked how he viewed continued market share gains by Chinese automakers in Europe, Luca de Meo replied with a meaningful remark: "I don’t know how my peers are doing it, but we will be as competitive as our Chinese competitors."

When? "Step by step. Starting now."

futuREady is a sober strategy. It is clear about who the competition is, clear about the gap, and clear about where not to fight. But there will always be a gap between clear-sightedness and execution. Its success or failure ultimately hinges on a fundamental question: can Europe’s industrial system achieve Chinese-style efficiency without breaking its own social contract?

This is not just Renault's challenge, but a question the entire European auto industry must answer in the next five years.

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