Saudi Arabia is reportedly preparing a Middle Eastern version of a "non-aggression pact" to promote reconciliation between Gulf countries and Iran, and the exclusion of Israel may become the biggest issue.
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After months of warfare in the Middle East and successive missile and drone attacks on Gulf states, Saudi Arabia is pushing a bold plan that could reshape the region’s security landscape.
According to British media reports on Thursday the 14th local time, informed sources said Saudi Arabia is discussing a proposed “Middle East Non-Aggression Pact” with several Arab countries and regional partners, aiming to promote the establishment of a long-term security mechanism between the Gulf and surrounding countries with Iran. The initiative seeks to set “red lines” and crisis communication mechanisms for future regional conflicts to prevent the region from sliding into all-out war again.
The report states that this idea takes the 1970s European “Helsinki Process” during the Cold War as a potential reference model. Multiple European governments and EU institutions have already expressed support for the initiative, considering it the best path to avoid future conflicts while providing Tehran with security assurances.
However, there are significant obstacles to the realization of Saudi Arabia’s concept. An Arab diplomat pointed out that the effectiveness of a non-aggression pact depends largely on its participants. The diplomat emphasized: “In the current political climate, it is impossible for Iran and Israel to join at the same time … Without Israel, the pact could backfire, because after Iran, Israel is seen as the main source of conflict. But Iran will not disappear, and that is precisely why the Saudis are pushing this idea.”
Behind this diplomatic initiative promoted by Saudi Arabia lies the Gulf states’ profound concerns about regional disorder after a war with Iran. At present, Pakistan is taking the lead in mediating between the US and Iran. Qatar and Turkey have been proposed to join the Shaba defense agreement, and a regional strategic cooperation framework centered on Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Turkey, and Egypt is taking shape. This geopolitical restructuring is expected to have a profound impact on Middle East energy security, regional stability expectations, and asset pricing.
How does Saudi Arabia want to promote the "Non-Aggression Pact"?
According to the aforementioned British media report on Thursday, the framework envisioned by Saudi Arabia is not merely a simple ceasefire agreement, but rather akin to a “regional security community.”
Sources stated that the Saudi government hopes to push for agreements among Gulf Arab states, Iran, and some Middle Eastern countries on principles such as non-aggression, non-support for cross-border proxy attacks, and ensuring energy and shipping security.
The report noted that Saudi Arabia is especially focused on the following core objectives:
- Preventing Iran and its proxy forces from attacking Gulf energy facilities again;
- Reducing the risk of the Strait of Hormuz being blocked;
- Establishing long-term crisis communication channels;
- Avoiding the Gulf states being drawn into another US-Iran or Israel-Iran war;
- Providing a stable environment for regional economic recovery and energy exports.
Even more noteworthy is that Saudi Arabia hopes this framework can reduce dependence on US security protection. The report stated that Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, and Pakistan have recently been discussing a broader defense cooperation mechanism; Pakistan has even suggested expanding the prior joint defense agreement with Saudi Arabia to include Qatar and Turkey.
To some extent, Saudi Arabia is attempting to promote a regional security order for a "post-American era."
Why does Saudi Arabia suddenly want “reconciliation”?
If one only looked at the past few months’ situation, this proposal might even seem abnormal.
Because just recently, several media outlets revealed that both Saudi Arabia and the UAE had secretly carried out military strikes against Iran.
Monday’s reports disclosed that the Saudi air force had secretly bombed targets inside Iran at the end of March in retaliation for previous Iranian attacks on Saudi oil and gas facilities and civilian targets. There were also reports that the UAE had participated in similar covert operations against Iranian targets.
Yet, precisely because of this round of war, Gulf states are increasingly realizing that even with advanced air defense systems and American support, they still cannot completely insulate themselves from the conflict.
The Strait of Hormuz crisis, in particular, had a huge impact on the Gulf states.
American media pointed out that supply disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz during the war severely hit Gulf states’ economic transformation plans, as tourism, technology, real estate, and finance—all non-oil sectors—were impacted.
For Saudi Arabia, which is advancing its “Vision 2030,” a prolonged regional war would mean: impeded foreign investment, risks to energy exports, pressure on large infrastructure and tourism projects, and damage to the Gulf’s image as a “safe haven” for assets.
Therefore, Riyadh’s current approach is increasingly resembling a “two-pronged strategy”: on one hand, limited military deterrence signals to Iran its retaliatory capability; on the other, diplomatic mechanisms are being sought to “lock the conflict back in the cage.”
The biggest challenge: What about Israel?
However, the obstacles to realizing Saudi Arabia’s Middle East version of a Non-Aggression Pact are also significant. One of the most difficult issues is Israel.
The Thursday report points out that the currently discussed framework does not include Israel. This means it is more of a “Gulf-Iran” security arrangement rather than a comprehensive peace mechanism covering the entire Middle East.
The problem is that Israel is now deeply embedded in the Gulf security landscape.
In recent years, under the impetus of the "Abraham Accords," security cooperation between the UAE and Israel has deepened rapidly; meanwhile, Iran increasingly regards some Gulf states as part of the Israeli camp.
This puts Saudi Arabia in an extremely complex balancing act: fully excluding Israel means the agreement may not truly resolve the core regional security dilemma; but including Israel would make it hard for Iran to accept.
Making things even more complicated, the Gulf states themselves are not unified internally.
The report says that on Iran, the UAE takes a much tougher stance than Saudi Arabia, has closer coordination with Israel, and thus its willingness to join this framework is questionable.
In addition, the US factor remains ever-present.
Although Saudi Arabia seeks to reduce reliance on the US security system, the reality is that the US remains the most important military power in the Gulf. The pressure campaign against Iran previously pushed by the Trump administration has put Gulf countries in a dilemma between “continuing to rely on the US” and “trying to avoid being drawn into a major war.”
Is the Middle East entering a “new equilibrium” phase?
From a broader perspective, Saudi Arabia’s push for a "Non-Aggression Pact" this time actually reflects a new strategic shift emerging in the Middle East as a whole.
For the past decade or so, the main logic in the Middle East has been "camp confrontation."
But after this round of war with Iran, more and more regional states are realizing that all-out conflict leaves almost no winners.
Iran suffered heavy blows but was not completely crushed; Gulf states, despite their wealth and advanced weaponry, exposed their own vulnerabilities in infrastructure; the US is under immense pressure from war costs and energy shocks.
Therefore, what Saudi Arabia is now promoting is, to some extent, a logic of “limited coexistence”: not necessarily truly trusting one another, but at least avoiding another uncontrolled war.
This may also mean that the Middle East is gradually shifting from the all-out confrontation of past years to a new, fragile balance.
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