The "final straw" that broke Meizu phones
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Author | Huang Yu
From the former “small and elegant” to the “large ecosystem” after Geely’s takeover, Meizu phones have undergone several strategic shifts and management upheavals in just a few years.
However, as the Year of the Horse begins, the signal for Meizu phone’s ultimate ending after three years of rebirth seems to be growing stronger.
At the beginning of January, Meizu China CMO Wan Zhiqiang was still confidently announcing at the Spring Festival gala that Meizu 23 would debut mid-year and challenge “the thinnest bezel in history.”
But only a month later, the situation took a dramatic turn. By mid-February, news broke that the Meizu 23 R&D project had officially ceased, the outsourced team was laid off, and existing staff could no longer keep the project going.
According to Jiemian News, Meizu’s phone business has essentially halted and will officially exit the market in March 2026. Meizu’s FlymeAuto in-vehicle business will operate independently, and the Meizu brand may remain within the Geely ecosystem.
At this time, it has been only about half a year since Meizu founder Jack Wong’s younger brother Wong Zhipan replaced Su Jing as Meizu Group’s new CEO.
If Meizu was once the “white moonlight” of the mobile industry, it is now more like a survivor struggling to find breathing space amidst the giants.
Although Meizu has not officially confirmed abandoning the phone business, in the highly competitive smartphone market, this silence is, to a certain extent, a prelude to departure, letting the market sense a certain endgame atmosphere.
This unease isn’t unfounded.
In recent years, with memory and chip prices continuing to rise, the already razor-thin profit margins for small and medium-sized phone manufacturers have been further squeezed. Before this, some tech bloggers had revealed that due to cost pressures, certain manufacturers have been forced to halt next-generation flagship development, and even face the extreme situation of exiting some regional markets.
Once synonymous with “small and beautiful”, Meizu is now thrust back into the public spotlight. People begin to ponder whether this brand, which carries countless youthful memories for Meizu fans, is truly about to bid farewell to its original foundation—the smartphone business.
The Last Stand Failed
Meizu’s current predicament was already hinted at when Meizu 22 was released.
Meizu and the newly appointed Wong Zhipan desperately needed a new product to regain market share, but the Meizu 22, originally scheduled for the 618 shopping festival last year, ended up delayed twice.
Finally, on September 15, 2025, at the “Return” themed Meizu 22 flagship and Flyme AIOS ecosystem launch event, Meizu launched its new flagship—the Meizu 22. This was nearly two years after the previous flagship Meizu 21.
At the time, Xingji Meizu's China CMO Wan Zhiqiang admitted: “The Meizu 22 was delayed, we were under a lot of pressure. Why did Meizu 22 come so late? Besides many unexpected factors, we have to admit that its development was harder than expected.”
He also said that Meizu 22 was the most thoroughly refined phone in Meizu’s history.
Soon, Wong Zhipan revealed in a media interview that the delay was mainly due to two factors: first, the company made some business adjustments over the past year; second, industry growth slowed, competition stabilized, and the current international economic situation made fundraising harder, forcing a rethink on product timing and resource allocation.
“My goal is to release a new flagship every May to catch the 618 promotion.” But Wong Zhipan acknowledged that realistically, Meizu might need one or two more product generations to complete the overall adjustment. Meizu is still small, with limited capital and technology compared to industry leaders. So the second half of 2026 is a safer time frame.
“The next generation is most likely to launch in the second half of 2026, but I’ll try to bring it forward.”
That was Wong Zhipan’s pledge, but with fierce external competition and internal strategic turbulence, Meizu has not yet rebuilt market confidence with this product.
Though Meizu 22 is touted as a “flagship” in official rhetoric, its Qualcomm Snapdragon 8s Gen4 chip is actually lower-tier—on par with models like Redmi Turbo4 Pro and OPPO K13 Pro, both selling under 2,000 yuan. Yet Meizu 22 starts at 2,999 yuan—about 1,000 yuan higher.
Lacking core competitiveness, this pricing strategy undoubtedly tests consumer loyalty.
A source close to Meizu told WallstreetCN that Meizu 22’s disappointing sales may be the last straw for Meizu’s phone business.
Asked how much sales Meizu 22 needed to support its R&D and costs, Wong Zhipan said even at a price of 2,999 yuan, after accounting for channel fees and marketing, Meizu 22 was selling hardware at a loss.
This suggests Meizu has lost bargaining power in the supply chain, and low sales make it hard to amortize costs.
Shareholder Support Weakens
As a veteran industry player, Meizu has had its moments of glory in the Chinese phone market, but fierce competition and strategic missteps relegated it to “Others,” forcing it to survive as “small and beautiful.”
To break out and rebirth, Meizu decided to sell itself.
In July 2022, this “fallen aristocrat” caught the eye of Li Shufu; Geely’s Xingji Times acquired 79.09% of Meizu’s shares, later merging into Xingji Meizu Group.
As a core executive in the Geely system, Shen Ziyu was the first head of Xingji Meizu Group. During his tenure, the group proposed a shift from traditional phone manufacturing to a full-stack smart terminal platform, starting with the auto industry and hoping to integrate phones, XR, and smart cars technologies & products.
In March 2023, Shen Ziyu at the group’s first strategic communication meeting asked Meizu to return to the top five in the national mid-to-high-end phone market within three years and adopted a “Not making low-end machines, focusing on mid-to-high-end boutique” product strategy.
Many people expected that “leaning on a big tree is good for shade”, believing Meizu could thrive with Geely’s strong financial backing.
However, for Geely as an industrial capital, the motivation for acquiring Meizu isn’t to compete in the smartphone red ocean, but to fill the gap in automotive intelligence transformation.
Geely values Meizu’s UI and system customization capabilities, and Flyme Auto’s successful application in multiple Geely models indeed demonstrates the value of this ecosystem integration.
Li Shufu tried to take Meizu public, but with ongoing losses, inability to break even, and continued status as “Others,” his attitude changed, and the IPO was never heard of again.
A former Meizu employee close to senior management told WallstreetCN that under current economic conditions, Geely no longer wants to inject more capital into Meizu, further aggravating Meizu’s funding woes.
For Meizu, the phone business is transforming from “core entry point” to “heavy burden.” Hopes of a synergistic phone + car model delivering 1+1>2 were dashed; the weak phone business couldn’t support car sales, and even Meizu-branded cars were cancelled due to Geely’s internal brand contraction.
Against this background, investor enthusiasm for injecting major capital into phones is fading.
Su Jing’s departure and Wong Zhipan’s return are seen as a revival of traditional genes, perhaps signifying asset liquidation and business transformation.
Interestingly, according to Qichacha’s updated business info, in January this year, Hubei Xingji Meizu Technology Co. Ltd. (Xingji Meizu) had senior management changes, with Shen Ziyu, long resigned as chairman & CEO of Meizu, returning as chairman.
For shareholders pursuing investment returns, shedding inefficient hardware R&D and focusing resources on AI ecosystem and smart cockpit is the most logical business decision.
Meizu abandoning the phone hardware business may be a form of damage control, losing a low-volume, powerless terminal but gaining focus on core system algorithms and new tracks like AI glasses.
A securities consumer electronics analyst told WallstreetCN, Geely Group doesn’t need a phone brand that loses money for marketing—it needs a system developer that can quickly adapt to global auto models and set industry standards.
Ongoing Management Turbulence
Lack of funding is only one aspect—another key reason for a company's decline is the turmoil of its core team.
In the past five years, Meizu has undergone rare high-level shakeups, changing CEOs four times in five years.
From Jack Wong handing over the reins to his brother Wong Zhipan in 2021, to Geely’s takeover with Shen Ziyu at the helm, then finance-backgrounded Su Jing, and finally Wong Zhipan’s return—this revolving-door personnel change kept Meizu’s strategy fragmented.
With the AI large model wave rising, on February 18, 2024, Meizu became the first phone maker to announce stopping traditional smartphone R&D. By Meizu’s strategy, it would go all in on “Tomorrow’s Devices” (AI For New Generations), with the first new AI terminal to launch within 2024.
At that time, as Xingji Meizu chairman & CEO, Shen Ziyu said Meizu would use limited resources and time toward something greater.
By plan, Meizu would update its phone OS, building AI-era foundational capabilities; by 2026, aim for #1 domestic AI device market share and a complete ecosystem.
Slogans were loud, Meizu gave off strong confidence of rebirth.
10 days after the “ALL in AI” strategy, Meizu launched the new Meizu 21 PRO, defining it as a tomorrow device for the AI era.
On launch day, former Meizu executive Li Nan served as keynote speaker as a senior Meizu fan, and Flyme system soul Yang Yan returned to talk about Flyme's AI features.
Bringing veterans back was clearly a positive signal to rebuild a crack team.
On February 25, as rumors of Meizu’s phone business halting were rampant, Li Nan posted on Weibo revealing part of the old story.
He pointed out: “Over two years ago, I did a secret plan for Meizu's revival, but it was never fully executed. The main reason—the first step was radical layoffs, keeping only a few hundred people. I knew leaders without deep 2C market lessons wouldn't do this, but I also knew it was the only right path to save the brand.”
Li Nan and others never returned, and unexpectedly, less than three months after the Meizu 21 PRO launch, Star Era president Su Jing became CEO and Shen Ziyu left.
At the time, Xingji Meizu was actively planning a Hong Kong IPO, with internal optimism for 2024 listing.
During Su Jing’s period, former XPeng executive Liao Qinghong also joined Meizu as COO and was pushed into the spotlight. Under the new plan, Meizu aimed to build an ecosystem centered on Flyme AIOS, with smartphones, smart glasses, and smart cars developing together, launching the value-focused Lucky phone series and StarV smart glasses.
In a March 2025 meeting, Liao Qinghong told WallstreetCN that in the past six months, Xingji Meizu had worked hard on “3+1”: with AI as the foundation, focusing on product innovation, globalization, and ecosystem building, with future exploration around AI phones and smart glasses.
But in terms of positioning, at this stage Meizu phones focused on mid- and low-end, in contrast to Shen Ziyu’s earlier mid- to high-end strategy.
Just as the public thought Meizu was on the right track, two months later, Su Jing suddenly resigned as CEO, and by July, Wong Zhipan’s Weibo was updated to confirm him as Xingji Meizu CEO, confirming the personnel change.
A source close to Meizu told WallstreetCN that Su Jing resigned voluntarily, likely due to huge internal pressures, limited Geely support, and believing it would be very hard for Meizu to succeed.
After Su Jing's resignation, Liao Qinghong, former Xingji Meizu VP Zeng Yang, and multiple other executives resigned, signaling Meizu’s subsequent business difficulties.
Core talent loss slowed Flyme updates, even Yang Yan, the soul of Flyme, broke with the company, publicly quarreling over Meizu 22’s sales on Weibo last August/September. This reflects complex internal interests, accelerating brand decline.
Deep in the Stream of Cutthroat Competition
“If you lack an elite, bold team, then no strategy or tactics matter. A huge, chaotic organization with scattered minds can't break through. Today, plaud sales break a million, meta will break ten million, while Meizu fades away. Nothing to regret. When the team has no battle power, fans’ expectations for revival are in vain.”
Li Nan’s words on February 25 seem a fitting epitaph for the passing of Meizu phones.
The ever-intensifying competition in the phone industry may be the core reason for Meizu’s decisive exit.
The phone market has entered a phase of high concentration and extreme internal competition.
IDC reports that in 2025, China’s smartphone shipments were about 285 million units, down 0.6% year-on-year. At the start of the year, government subsidies and holiday sales promoted growth, but momentum failed to sustain. Later, with demand pulled forward, government funds used up, and rising costs, the market continued to fall year-on-year.
Meanwhile, IDC data shows that Huawei, Apple, vivo, Xiaomi, and OPPO—the top five—now command nearly 80% market share, leaving little survival space for “Others.” In this competitive situation, Meizu struggles.
The Matthew effect means that without huge shipment volumes to support supply chain costs and R&D, small and mid-sized makers can boast about “experience” over “specs,” but rarely survive the war.
Insiders believed that soaring memory prices, due to global memory chip shortages and AI server demand surges, may be the final straw.
A consumer electronics industry source revealed that memory chip procurement costs for smartphones have risen over 80% year-on-year with no signs of slowing.
Market research firm Counterpoint Research noted that DRAM price spikes have raised BoM costs by about 25%, 15%, and 10% for low-, mid-, and high-end smartphones. By Q2 2026, average cost impact will remain at 10%-15%.
Counterpoint Research Senior Analyst Yang Wang points out that at lower price points, phones have little room for price increases. If costs can't be fully passed on, OEMs may adjust product strategies. Recently, reductions in shipments of low SKU products have been observed.
WallstreetCN also learned from the supply chain that to cope with rising costs, several leading brands plan a new round of price hikes in early March. This will be the largest industry-wide adjustment in five years.
At the same time, Counterpoint and IDC have lowered their global and China shipment forecasts for 2026, further increasing pressures on manufacturers.
With rapid technological change, many brands have fallen behind or exited: internationally—Nokia, BlackBerry, Ericsson, LG, Siemens, Sharp; domestically—Meitu, Amoi, Gionee, Smartisan, LeEco.
At the start of 2026, at Asus’s year-end party, Asus chairman Shi Chongtang announced the Zenfone and ROG dual brands would stop launching new models from 2026, marking the end of 23 years of Asus in phones.
In the brutal elimination race, small and mid-sized phone makers struggle, Meizu won’t be the first to exit, nor the last.
For the phone industry, Meizu’s potential departure mirrors the bottleneck in hardware innovation.
The appeal of phones as core terminals is diluted by over-competition. For investors and manufacturers, cutting inefficient businesses is now a consensus.
This choice may make the brand disappear in hardware, but from a business perspective, it means moving limited R&D resources from a bloody red ocean to next-gen interaction terminals (like AI glasses)—a wise move.
In this process, what is lost is an era’s obsession, what is gained may be a ticket to the future intelligent ecosystem.
Letting go of phone obsessiveness and focusing elsewhere may be a rebirth for Meizu.
The market is cruel—it gives stragglers little chance for makeup exams—but for companies brave enough to cut losses and restart in the right direction, there is still room in the future.
Risk warnings and disclaimerThe market carries risks; investment should be cautious. This article does not constitute personal investment advice, nor does it consider particular users’ special investment goals, financial status, or needs. Users should consider whether any opinion, viewpoint, or conclusion herein matches their particular circumstances. Invest accordingly, at your own risk. ```