Wei Jianjun's crucial battle with his family name at stake
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Author | Zhou Zhiyu
After building cars for 36 years, Great Wall Motors chairman Wei Jianjun has never served as a spokesperson for any specific model.
On the evening of May 18, the V9X was launched with a starting price of 349,800 yuan. This also marks the first mass-produced car from the Guiyuan S platform. More importantly, however, is the new role Wei Jianjun has given himself: “a full-chain, lifetime spokesperson.” From R&D, quality control, to after-sales, the founder has tied himself to the entire lifecycle of one vehicle.
The significance of this move must be understood in the context of WEY brand’s position. The story of Chinese brands breaking the 300,000 mark has been told for almost a decade; Ideal (Li Auto) and AITO have already proved it’s achievable. In 2025, the Blue Mountain and Highland models let WEY brand regain a 100,000-unit annual sales level, bringing the average transaction price to 300,000 yuan, making it the fastest-growing brand within Great Wall’s system. At least the story now has a promising start.
But selling 100,000 is just proof of survival; the V9X needs to answer a more fundamental question: what does this brand truly represent and who is responsible for its direction? Veteran car maker Wei Jianjun has placed a big bet.
In 2016, he put his surname on the brand as a first move; nine years later, he’s binding himself to a car—this is his showdown. The Guiyuan S platform has a whole lineup waiting behind the V9X to see its debut results first.
The Bet
Priced from 349,800 to 389,800 yuan. The V9X doesn’t compete head-on with the 500,000 yuan segment of AITO M9 or Li Auto L9, but occupies a subtle space instead: six-seat large SUV, 350,000 to 400,000 yuan, currently focusing on plug-in hybrids. There’s real family demand in this segment.
This market is also targeted by numerous automakers. On May 19, Gong Min, head of UBS China auto research, told Wallstreetcn that many car companies are desperate to release large 9-series vehicles, with more large SUVs and increasing homogenization, which remains a lasting challenge for the industry.
If the 500,000-yuan models sell identity and technology benchmarks, and the 200,000-yuan models sell cost-performance, then 350,000 yuan is stuck in the middle—consumers want strong products but are extremely sensitive to brand premium. It’s a tough spot: you can’t win on configuration or pricing, nor do you have enough brand aura for impulse purchases.
The V9X chooses to tackle the market with a platform strategy. Great Wall has spent six years building the Guiyuan S platform, characterized by a structural choice: the same chassis architecture supports five powertrains, with more than 90% parts commonality.
This choice is controversial. In recent years, “dedicated EV platforms” have become something of an industry consensus, with mainstream automakers creating exclusive structures for pure EVs.
Wei Jianjun’s judgment differs. “For nearly a decade, we’ve been misled by this dedicated EV platform concept,” he said at the launch. In his view, the problem is volume: Over half the world’s countries lack proper charging infrastructure, so “all-in on EVs” means abandoning much of the global market. Without scale, R&D costs can’t be shared, supply chains can’t be broadened, and residual values become a problem.
He spelled out the math: “Any product with high resale value has a large installed base. With more units, there are more repair shops, cheaper parts, mature service skills.” The idea behind S Platform is to support global volume with multiple powertrains first, then lower costs through scale effects.
The logic seems self-consistent, but with a condition: each powertrain must have no obvious shortcomings. Can a platform supporting five powertrains surpass dedicated EV platforms for full electric experience? Can it rival other brands in PHEV efficiency? The V9X answers with specs: 800V architecture, WLTC fuel consumption of 6.3L, CLTC range of 1700 km.
Brands like Li Auto and AITO are more direct competitors. These companies have already established user recognition and reputation in this price range and deliver steadily every month. Their approaches and Guiyuan’s are almost opposites: single-category focus, rapid iterations, saturating one user scenario in China thoroughly.
This strategy makes their brand positioning sharp—mention “family six-seat SUV,” and consumers think of Li Auto or similar brands first. The pitfall is that rapid iteration erodes old car owners’ residual values, but Li Auto is betting Chinese consumption upgrade is fast enough to offset the problem.
Guiyuan is slower, heavier, and hedges its bets—neither on a single market nor powertrain, seeking to use a common platform for global scale. It’s not new in auto manufacturing; the Volkswagen MQB and Toyota TNGA embody this logic, but such platforms back companies selling millions annually. WEY’s current 100,000 annual volume—can it support this ambition? That needs time to play out.
In 2025, Great Wall Motors' marketing expenses soared 44%—the extra 2.8 billion yuan mostly spent on WEY’s direct sales channels and brand promotion. WEY New Energy direct stores now cover 110 cities and over 430 stores. Great Wall’s 2026 goal: not less than 1.8 million units sold, net profit not less than 10 billion. If V9X can quickly ramp up, the Guiyuan S platform gets the scale effect, helping to offset the initial investment.
The Chips
The S Platform is the wager, but WEY needs to solve a deeper problem.
Over the past nine years, WEY’s biggest issue wasn’t poor products—it was lacking a stable identity. When the Tank sub-brand went independent in 2021, it took not only a product line but also the only clear consumer recognition in WEY’s system. WEY tried many directions—changing naming systems, brand tags, leaders—with each change bringing new strategies, and the previous ones scratched before conclusion. Wei Jianjun also admits, “The past few years, WEY really faced difficulties—declining sales, shifting position.”
The Blue Mountain and Highland in 2025 answered, “Can WEY survive?” The next V9X question: Why should someone spending 350,000 on a car feel right to choose WEY? The direct sales network, marketing resources, and declining profits Great Wall has spent to build for this brand all need V9X to prove their value.
This is the real reason Wei Jianjun is stepping in personally.
When a brand changes positioning too often and consumers no longer remember what you stand for, the founder stepping up to say “I’ll guarantee it with my surname” is essentially using personal credit in place of brand credit.
But just saying “guaranteed” isn’t enough; it matters how you do it. Wei Jianjun said, “I have no retreat,” then added, “I’m not doing this to perform or show diligence; it’s to make sure management takes responsibility, information flows, results matter, and problems close quickly.” He then announced he’ll personally experience the purchase, delivery, and service process, and will set up a senior management team for direct online Q&A and solutions.
WEY CEO Zhao Yongpo feels the pressure. He joked: “Wei can’t run; if I can’t satisfy users, I can leave at any time.”
But the right attitude doesn’t guarantee a win. The reality facing V9X is that competitors like Li Auto and AITO already have solid reputation loops in this price range, and if V9X wants a share, it ultimately depends on the product’s persuasiveness.
In addition to attitude, Wei Jianjun has “put real money on the table.” The V9X’s customer benefit package sends a signal: six years or 150,000 km warranty, covering costly items like air suspension and rear steering—normally only 3-4 years' coverage in the industry; lifetime free driver assistance software updates, usually worth over 30,000 yuan.
Covering after-sales risk is the most direct way to persuade consumers. Of course, such generous benefits mean Great Wall must reserve significant after-sales funds per car throughout its lifecycle.
Interestingly, Wei Jianjun doubled down as a founder spokesperson just as the industry is moving the opposite way. Since 2025, Chinese NEV brands have rushed to sign celebrity spokespeople. Founder-IP marketing is on the decline—Li Xiang is behind the scenes, Lei Jun is experiencing diminishing returns from personal exposure. The consensus is shifting from “the founder is the best spokesperson” to “the brand should not rely on the founder.”
Wei Jianjun goes against this tide, binding himself to V9X as “lifetime spokesperson.” His logic is different—celebrities bring exposure and buzz, but not the credibility of product quality. A founder who’s been building cars for 36 years publicly says, “I’ll take care of this car for life”—that sends a message no celebrity can. When something goes wrong, someone is accountable.
This may be the most efficient way to build trust at this stage for WEY. But founder credit isn’t like an ad budget you can renew every year; it’s more of a trump card—if played right, the brand is set; if wrong, there’s no second chance.
Asked what he’d do if it backfires, Wei Jianjun said anything is possible, but “values never fail.” V9X is just the beginning. Wallstreetcn understands that the Guiyuan platform will also be adopted by ORA and other brands’ models in the future.
The first batch of V9X vehicles has begun delivery; in the coming months, real owner feedback will be more convincing than all the launch promises combined.
It took China’s auto industry 40 years to learn how to make good cars, and another decade to learn how to sell cars for high prices. The next challenge is making consumers willing to pay a brand premium for a Chinese brand, even without anyone standing behind it.
Wei Jianjun has wagered his surname—it’s more than just about the success or failure of one car. If V9X succeeds, WEY has a chance to become a brand that doesn’t have to rely on its founder’s personal assurance. That might be what he truly wants to win this time.
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